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and how can we ever come to an understanding if we all have a world 
of things inside ourselves and each one of us has his own private world. 
i put in the words i utter the sense and the value that i expect them 
to have, but whoever is listening to me inevitably thinks that those 
same words have a different sense and value, because of the private 
world he has inside himself. We think we understand each other, but 
we never really do!
luigi pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author
Introduction
for over ten years, the political life in poland has been significantly affected 
by the dispute between two parties: civic platform (po) and law and justice 
(piS). for a long period of time the controversy has been something more than 
a struggle between two different sets of opinions concerning political issues ex-
pressed inside and outside the parliament. These are two different narratives 
that concern almost every problem or situation that can be a subject to political 
interpretation. important events such as Smolensk air crash or Warsaw Uprising, 
famous people both living and already deceased, including lech Wałęsa or Ma-
jor zygmunt Szendzielarz “łupaszka,” symptomatic words such as for example, 
Poland exists only in theory, or Nobody is going to be deprived of their life by this 
man ever again, are only a few of many striking examples of politicised subjects 
of dispute that for the recent ten years have become occasions for a confronta-
tion of attitudes and opinions, going far beyond the strictly political problems.
differences in opinions, views, and judgements that compose the aforemen-
tioned picture of contemporary poland, its past and future, are obviously typical 
not only of politicians. The dispute has been arising among family members, 
friends, and in occupational environments, and it has been driven by voters of 
both parties, their partisans, and even people who are little interested in politics. 
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This is because media that are involved in this conflict, perform a significant role 
in its strengthening, and frequently even escalation, through their narratives. its 
sharp character often encourages some journalists to formulate a thesis about 
two metaphoric polands inhabited by two tribes that are alien to each other. al-
though they use the same language, they cannot communicate because different 
meanings are attributed to the same notions.1
The goal of this paper is an attempt to describe these two metaphoric tribes, 
their objective characteristics and qualities, as well as their shared beliefs and 
identity-related distinguishing features. The results of the sociological research 
performed by centrum badania opinii Społecznej [public opinion research 
centre] between 2001 and 2016, and a series of interviews conducted in spring 
2016 with po and piS voters, constituted the basis for observations and conclu-
sions formulated in the paper.2 
Po and Pis Voters. From sympathy to antipathy
certainly, for many contemporary young voters who played a very im-
portant role in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015, it may 
be hard to imagine that the two main, opposing political parties of po and 
piS, which were competing with each other in the two campaigns, ten years 
earlier had also been preparing for both the autumn parliamentary and pres-
idential pre-election campaigns. Their goal then was the victory over Sojusz 
lewicy demokratycznej (Sld) [democratic left alliance] and the formation 
of a coalition government. in the parliamentary elections both parties won 
1 tiny, hand-written notes that were made on the margins of a book that has recently been 
borrowed from the library can be a small but symptomatic expression of engagement of some 
people in the analysed dispute. While reading this historical novel by a contemporary polish writer, 
the previous, anonymous reader of the book, using her (as can be supposed on the basis of the 
handwriting) hand-made notes, commented on the existing political situation in poland while 
comparing qualities of some contemporary political leaders with certain historical characters. The 
nature of the comments shows that the book reader is not a piS supporter. The aforementioned 
situation may constitute the reason for considering the much broader phenomenon of permeation 
of the described political dispute into all spheres of life in poland. journalists – the commentators 
of this reality – in this context speak for example, about two versions of history, that is, history 
as approached by civic platform (po) or law and justice (piS), about a civic platform (po) or 
law and justice (piS) type of book, their poem or interpretation, etc. 
2 interviews were conducted with twelve people declaring significant interest in the current 
political events, which was one of the criteria of the interviewees’ selection for the research. 
pre-election support granted to one of the parties of the political dispute: po or piS, was the next 
important selection criterion. Some survey participants emphasised this by defining themselves as 
platformers [po supporters] or piSowcy [piS supporters]. two people participating in the survey 
described themselves as previous po voters that voted for the representatives of nowoczesna.pl 
party in the last election.
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288 parliamentary seats, while gaining the support of over 51 per cent of 
voters. This created proper conditions both for the formation of the govern-
ment called popiS, which had been appointed several months before the 
governmental election, and for the implementation of political changes de-
clared in the pre-election campaigns by both parties. They were described with 
a slogan affirming the formation of The 4th republic of poland. however, this 
government was never formed. negotiations between the potential coalition 
members can be perceived as a symbolic beginning of the fundamental conflict 
between po and piS. They were unsuccessful, and consequently, piS formed 
a governmental coalition with Samoobrona [Self-defence] and liga polskich 
rodzin [lpr – league of polish families]. Thereupon po became the largest 
opposition party in the parliament.
The determinants and reasons for the conflict are not discussed here as they 
are not the subject of interest of this paper. however, it seems reasonable to 
describe the electorates of the parties that had been declaring the formation of 
popiS coalition before the analysed conflict emerged and escalated. Therefore 
the reasons and explanations why a given party was voted for by its propo-
nents, as well as the party-related sympathies and antipathies should be looked 
at here. The willingness to vote for a particular party or parties, together with 
the antipathy towards other political entities, often constitute the essential dis-
tinguishing features of the political identity of individuals participating in the 
elections (holmberg 2010). 
in one of the first sociological surveys, the supporters of the newly formed 
po and piS political parties had the possibility to justify their intention to vote 
for them in the election that was planned for the autumn 2001. in both potential 
electorates, the reasons connected with postulated changes in the country were 
predominant (pankowski 2001a). in their statements, po supporters emphasised 
mainly the arguments that the party supported by them would create opportu-
nities for positive changes (50.0 per cent), and that it had a good economic pro-
gramme (44.0 per cent) and expert politicians who would be able to govern the 
country (34.0 per cent). on the other hand, the potential piS voters specifically 
stressed the fact that the politicians they wanted to vote for were independent 
and not involved in any deals with other parties (44.0 per cent). Moreover, it 
was believed that they would create opportunities for the reduction of crime 
rate and would improve security (43.0 per cent). They were perceived as honest, 
reliable, and corruption-free (34.0 per cent) (pankowski 2001a). The proponents 
of both parties claimed, most often of all the surveyed potential electorates, that 
the choice of new parties resulted from the fact that they were disappointed in 
the parties they had voted for in the previous election. 
This reluctance towards previously supported parties, combined with the wish 
for changes was, as it seems, an important element connecting po and piS elec-
torates. The rate of people declaring the will to vote for one more party, apart 
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from the one which is their first choice, is an impressive indicator of program 
convergence noticed by the potential voters of both parties. in the survey con-
ducted in june 2001, the respondents asked about their electoral preferences could 
include piS in their responses for the first time (the party had been formed a 
month before). While answering the question: If you could vote for candidates of 
one more party, which party would you choose as the second one?, the proponents 
of this party most frequently indicated po (26.0 per cent) (pankowksi 2001). on 
the other hand, po supporters, while responding to this question, most often in-
dicated piS (19.0 per cent). furthermore, both parties occupied distant locations 
in the rankings of parties which their supporters would never vote for. among piS 
proponents, po party was at the 7th position (15.0 per cent of the indications), 
and among po supporters, piS was at a distant 13th position (only 2.0 per cent 
of the indications). The same trends were reported in the next survey, conducted 
a month later, that focused on the issues of election (pankowski 2001a).
The data presented in tables 1 and 2 are a good illustration of changes in 
sympathies and antipathies of po proponents towards piS, and piS supporters 
towards po. The first includes the rate of supporters of both parties, asked by the 
interviewers of cboS [public opinion research centre] during several surveys 
conducted between 2001 and 2015, to indicate the party that they would be 
willing to vote for if they could vote not for one, but for two parties. table 2, 
in turn, shows the rate of proponents of both parties, who in the same period 
and in the same survey, provided answers to the question: Which parties would 
you certainly not vote for? in the case of all the quoted studies, the tables pres-
ent two parties most frequently mentioned by both categories of respondents. 
in table 1, these were the parties that enjoyed the greatest sympathy from po 
and piS supporters, and in table 2, there are those parties that were rejected by 
them. data compared in both tables allow one to notice a significant evolution 
of attitudes of the voters of both parties, from growing sympathy through its 
collapse to the really explicit antipathy.
in the period of first several years of presence of both parties on the political 
scene (po and piS were formed in 2001), a growing sympathy of po electorate 
towards piS, and piS electorate towards po was reported in sociological surveys. 
This process is clearly illustrated by the result of research conducted in May 2004 
as well as in february and june 2005 (table 1). in the first one it appears that 
in the opinions of their supporters po and piS constituted two complementary 
parties of scarcely different programs. Thus, in both potential electoral groups 
they were the parties of the second choice. This means they were the parties that 
would be voted for, if it was possible to vote for candidates of not one, but two 
parties. among piS supporters, 33 per cent would vote for po, and among po 
proponents, 31 per cent would vote for piS (cybulska 2004). The supporters of 
both parties were also unanimous in their decisions concerning the parties they 
would never vote for (table 2). in both cases these were Samoobrona [Self-de-
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fence], and Sld [democratic left alliance]. in the potential po electorate the first 
of the parties was rejected by 65 per cent and the other by 24 per cent. The dis-
tribution of negative indications for Samoobrona [Self-defence] and Sld [dem-
ocratic left alliance] among the potential piS voters differed only with respect 
to the value of rates – 44 per cent and 40 per cent respectively (cybulska 2004).
The other of the aforementioned surveys revealed that, less than a year later, 
for 40 per cent of po supporters piS was the party of the second choice, and for 
a slightly lower rate, that is, for 37 per cent of piS supporters, po was such a 
party (cybulska 2005). The two major parties rejected by po and piS supporters 
did not change. They were still Samoobrona [Self-defence] and Sld [democratic 
left alliance]. however, the distribution of supporters of both parties that would 
not vote for the aforementioned parties changed. in the case of po supporters 
the rates were 50 per cent and 33 per cent respectively, and among piS support-
ers the corresponding rates were 25 per cent and 51 per cent (cybulska 2004). 
Table 1. alternative political sympathies of potential po and piS electorates between 2001 and 2015 
          (data in percentage)
Surveys and the date when 
they were conducted
if you could vote for candidates of one 
more party, which party would you choose 
as the second one? 
potential electorates 
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[democratic left alliance] + Sdpl 
[Social democracy of poland] + pd 
[democratic party] + Up [labour 
Union]) 
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Sld [democratic left alliance]
Komitet wyborczy pawła Kukiza 










S ource :  the author’s own case study on the basis of the selected research by cboS [public opinion research 
centre] listed in references.
as a conclusion to the survey conducted in june 2005, which was four 
months before the parliamentary elections, while commenting on the fact that 
nearly half (48 per cent) of po [civic platform] supporters were also ready to 
support piS, and 44 per cent of piS voters would support po if they had the 
possibility to vote for one more party, agnieszka cybulska stated that: “Elector-
ates of both parties are the closest to each other; their supporters recognise each 
other as the most attractive alternative for the elections” (cybulska 2005a: 12).
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after the coalition negotiations, conducted by po and piS representatives, 
which ended in failure in autumn 2005, the conflict between the two parties 
started to escalate, and the distribution of political support in poland began to 
be increasingly polarised. in the early parliamentary election conducted in 2007, 
po and piS gained support of over 73 per cent of voters, and in the following 
election, of slightly less, that is, of 60 per cent of people participating. both in 
the first and in the second elections po obtained the highest number of votes 
and together with its coalition party – polskie Stronnictwo ludowe [pSl – polish 
people’s party] – they took the power for the next two terms.
The declining sympathy and growing antipathy of po electorate towards 
piS, and piS electorate towards po after 2005 is well illustrated by data includ-
ed in tables 1 and 2. The results of the survey conducted in September 2007 
revealed that, in comparison with the results of the survey conducted two years 
before, the willingness of piS supporters to vote for po decreased by half (to 
22 per cent), and the wish of po supporters to vote for piS declined sixfold 
(to 8 per cent) (table 1). in the same period, the aversion of piS voters to-
wards po grew even faster (almost twelvefold, from 3 per cent to 35 per cent), 
similarly to the pace of growth of antipathy of po voters towards piS (nearly 
twentyfold, from 3 per cent to 59 per cent) (table 2). The aforementioned 
survey also showed that, for the first time, lid [The left and democrats] 
was the first party of the second choice for po voters. it was the coalition 
of left-wing parties, in which Sld [democratic left alliance], the party that 
belonged to those that had been most often rejected by po supporters before, 
was the most noticeable participant. The presented data show that this party 
became the party of the second choice for po supporters. in the same period 
of time, initially pSl [polish people’s party], and since 2013 Solidarna polska 
zbigniewa ziobry [zbigniew ziobro United poland], performed the same role 
in the potential piS electorate. in 2015 Komitet Wyborczy pawła Kukiza [pawel 
Kukiz Election committee (joW movement)] became the party of the second 
choice for piS supporters.
after 2007 the hostility between po and piS electorates became even more 
apparent. Smolensk air crash in 2010 and its consequences performed an im-
portant role in its intensification. however, it should be emphasised that if in 
the potential po electorate piS became the most disliked party still before the 
Smolensk air crash (in May 2009, this choice was made by 61 per cent of po 
proponents), in the potential piS electorate, po became the most frequently 
rejected party a year after (in november 2010, 50 per cent of piS supporters 
definitely would not vote for po).
in the successive year of 2011, data that illustrate the mutual hostility of 
the electorates of both parties – po and piS – reached their extreme level. 
Three quarters (75 per cent) of po supporters and over two thirds (68 per cent) 
of piS supporters would definitely not cast their vote for the competing party. 
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it ought to be mentioned that, at the same time, the rate of people in po and 
piS electorates that would be ready to cast their additional vote for the party 
assessing the Smolensk air crash differently from the party of their first choice, 
declined to the supreme low values of a few percent (3 per cent in the poten-
tial po electorate and 6 per cent in the potential piS electorate). as the data 
included in tables 1 and 2 illustrate, in the successive years, the rate of people 
in the potential electorates of both parties declaring the antipathy (or sympathy) 
towards the competing party was not significantly changed.
Table 2. political antipathies of potential po and piS electorates between 2001 and 2015 (data in 
           percentage)
Survey and the date it was 
conducted 
Which parties would you definitely not 
vote for?
potential electorates
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po [civic platform party]
piS [law and justice party]
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S ource :  the author’s own case study on the basis of the selected data of cboS [public opinion research 
centre] included in references.
actually, both pre-election surveys conducted in 2015, as well as the re-
sults of parliamentary election conducted in the same year, allowed for the 
observation that the predominance of both parties over others, measured with 
the size of their electorate, was not as considerable as in the previous years. 
however, considering the fact that both entities were voted for by over 61 per 
cent, it was still remarkable, and the political conflict significantly affected the 
content and shape of the national political discourse. po and piS (together with 
KorWin) were among the parties that had the largest negative electorates – 
around one third of the people declaring their participation in parliamentary 
election would certainly not vote for any of them (cybulska 2015). The same 
survey confirmed that in the sphere of party sympathies and antipathies, the 
fundamental line of division in poland occurs between po and piS voters. po 
would not be voted for by 63 per cent of the people voting for piS (together 
with Solidarna polska [United poland], prawica rzeczypospolitej [right Wing 
of the republic] and polska razem [poland together]), whereas piS would not 
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be voted for by even more, because by 68 per cent of po voters (cybulska 
2015). for over five years, while asked about the party they would certainly 
not vote for, the voters of both parties have responded according to the model 
in which piS voters usually mentioned po, and people voting for po always 
indicated piS (table 2).
similarities and differences between Party electorates
of Po and Pis
in the analysis of the results of a survey conducted several months before 
the parliamentary election in 2015, agnieszka cybulska stated: “although the 
emergence of new political initiatives slightly refreshed the traditional structure 
of political sympathies and antipathies that have been existing for many years, 
the major line of bipolar division is still observed. The political scene is still 
most strongly diversified by the division between po and piS. Electorates of 
both of these parties can be described as most separable” (cybulska 2015: 11). 
The aforementioned conclusion means that electorates of both parties defined in 
2005 as most similar to each other (cybulska 2005a: 12), ten years later became 
most separable with respect to each other (cybulska 2005a: 11). does this “sep-
arability” manifested in the declared mutual aversion of po and piS voters find 
its reflection in the objective differences in the sphere of social composition of 
both electorates and their members’ opinions? in other words, are po and piS 
voters similar with respect to the important social and demographic features, or 
do they significantly differ from each other?; also, in which areas are the views 
of supporters of both parties convergent, and what are the significant differences 
between them? 
The results of a survey conducted in october 2015 allow one to state that 
the potential electorate groups of both parties show quite remarkable similarity 
to each other with respect to sex and age structure. although among people 
declaring their will to vote for po there are more women (55 per cent) than 
among piS proponents (51 per cent), and the average age of this party’s po-
tential voter is slightly lower (49 per cent) than in the case of piS voters (51 
per cent), the differences are not statistically important (badora 2015). despite 
some differences, lack of statistical significance is also characteristic of social 
and occupational structures of the potential voters of both parties. Significant 
differences between the discussed electorates occur in the case of such qual-
ities as the place of residence (half of the potential piS electorate live in the 
country and in po electorate there are 27 per cent of people living in rural 
areas), education (relatively high rate of piS voters have vocational education, 
and of po voters – secondary education), participation in religious practic-
es (three fourth of piS voters participate in religious practices at least once 
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a week, and there are 46 per cent of people attending such practices among 
po voters), and declared political opinions (61 per cent of piS voters declare 
right-wing views, and in po electorate there are more people of centre and 
left-wing views – 62 per cent) (badora 2015).
The comparison of the aforementioned features of the potential electorates 
of both parties with those that were reported in the survey conducted ten years 
earlier, in 2005, allows one to draw a conclusion that no important changes 
have occurred in their social and demographic structures (pankowski 2005). The 
change that took place in political declarations of po and piS supporters was 
the only significant one. in 2005, the majority of the potential voters of both 
parties defined their views as right-wing or centrist (more often po – 61 per 
cent than piS – 51.05 per cent). for the last ten years, in terms of their views, 
the proponents of both parties have moved towards their political opposites – 
po towards left wing and piS towards right wing. centrist orientation has been 
predominant among po voters (41 per cent) and right-wing orientation – among 
piS voters (61 per cent) (badora 2015).
The aforementioned movement of ideological declarations of the potential 
po and piS voters towards the broad spectrum ranging between the political 
right and left, finds only its partial reflection in the results of research focused 
on the opinions of both electorates on the subject of some more specific struc-
tural solutions (roguska 2005, 2016). from the surveys conducted both in 2005 
and in 2016, one may conclude that in many issues, the views of po and piS 
proponents were similar. in 2005 they included, among others, views concerning 
decommunisation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and its pace, social 
policy of the state, employment policy, tax system, methods of fighting against 
crime, relationships between the state and the church, as well as legal solutions 
concerning abortion. in all the mentioned problem areas, one can speak at most 
about a slightly different distribution of accents in the views of po proponents 
in comparison with the opinions of piS supporters. The attitude towards the 
European Union was the only problem that diversified the views of the propo-
nents of both parties more clearly. The opinion that poland should aim at the 
closest integration with the European Union was shared by 43 per cent of po 
supporters and by considerably less, because by 26 per cent of piS supporters 
(roguska 2005).
The survey conducted eleven years later showed in turn the convergence 
of views of po and piS proponents in such areas as social policy, employment 
policy, tax system, and Eastern policy of the state (roguska 2016). however, 
in comparison with 2005, in 2016, more divergences occurred in the views 
of both electorates. The most important of them are presented in table 3. in 
the case of several opinions which the respondents were asked about both 
in 2005 and 2016, statements collected during both surveys are presented in 
the table.
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Table 3. distribution of opinions of the potential po and piS voters concerning selected issues 
           (data in percentage)









poland should aim at retaining far-reaching independence from 
the European Union 
2005 33.0 49.0
2016 17.0 49.0
abortion should be permitted without any limitations 2005 28.0 26.0
2016 26.0 12.0
abortion should be completely banned 2005 48.0 52.0
2016 27.0 64.0
politics and public life should be based on the decalogue and 
religious values
2016 10.0 40.0
religious values should be binding only in private life of the 
believers
2016 82.0 40.0
law should allow people of the same gender to enter into a formal 
registered partnership
2016 32.0 18.0
law should never allow people of the same gender to enter into 
a formal registered partnership
2016 44.0 70.0
S ource :  the author’s own case study on the basis of roguska (2005, 2016).
The comparison shows that the main differences between the views of po 
and piS voters concern the attitude towards European integration. The views 
in this sphere have been clearly polarised. already in the previous decade, po 
proponents were more frequently the advocates of a closer integration of po-
land into the European Union structures than piS voters. currently, this view 
has become a predominant opinion among po electorate (66 per cent). in the 
same period of time, the rate of po voters that were supporters of retaining 
a far-reaching independence of poland from the European Union decreased by 
half (17 per cent). among piS supporters such an opinion has been shared by 
half of the potential electorate of the party (49 per cent). The rate of piS voters 
who are euroenthusiasts has not changed either (slightly over one fourth). peo-
ple belonging to the potential piS electorate are the supporters of a complete 
ban on abortion more frequently than eleven years ago (64 per cent). on the 
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other hand, in the potential po electorate such opinions have become clear-
ly less frequent in the last decade (27 per cent). The belief that Politics and 
public life should be based on the Decalogue and religious values, is clearly less 
frequently observed in the potential po electorate than in the piS electorate. 
This opinion is followed by 10 per cent of po voters and four times more of 
piS voters. differences between the discussed electorates in their approval for 
partnerships of people of the same gender are also considerable. forty-four 
per cent of po voters and 70 per cent of piS voters are the supporters of the 
lack of legal possibility for such relationships to enter the state of matrimony.
The survey results presented before suggest that, if one looked for an expla-
nation of the aforementioned shift of declarations of both electorates, that is, of 
po towards left-wing and of piS towards right-wing, it could mainly be found 
in the divergence of views in the sphere of impact of religion on legal solutions 
and political decisions. Such is the nature of the right-wing orientation of piS 
voters, and the increasing centrist and left-wing orientation of po voters. The 
distribution of emphasis in the views of both electorates on the subject of the 
postulated solutions in the sphere of economy or in social policy reveals in turn, 
that po supporters are closer to political right, and piS proponents are closer 
to political left. 
although some of the differences in the views of po and piS electorates are 
rather significant, it is difficult to find in them a convincing justification of the 
scale and intensity of antipathy between the proponents of both parties. as it 
can be presumed, these are not the differences in the approach of the propo-
nents towards economic, social, or political growth of the state, but in the vision 
of the disliked party, its leaders, members, and supporters and all the features 
and motivations attributed to them that are important and determine the mu-
tual aversion. These images, most often confronted with the ones that concern 
the party that is considered as one’s own (its leader, members, supporters, and 
qualities attributed to them), constitute broader multithreaded narratives with 
these elements emphasised that are significant for the political identity of the 
proponents of a particular party. 
recognition of these narratives and elements forming them was one of the 
most important goals of the interviews with the proponents of both discussed 
parties. although the key subjects of the interviews were those that concerned 
motivation for their own political choices, other aspects including the justifi-
cation of party-related sympathies and antipathies, the questions referring to 
the history of their own interests in politics, participation in elections, and 
assessment of past and current political events were equally important. it was 
assumed that the responses of the interviewed people who were either po or 
piS supporters, would constitute a partly common and partly divergent story 
of the recent twenty years of polish politics in particular. and actually, it was 
exactly like that.
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what unites and what separates Po and Pis supporters?
The attitude towards the political system of poland before 1989 is an impor-
tant common characteristics of political identity of the supporters of both par-
ties. They all assess that period negatively. This concerns both the respondents 
knowing the realities of life in socialism from their own experience, and also 
the younger respondents in their early twenties. Sometimes, the assessment 
of reality in poland before 1989, particularly by elderly people, is less critical, 
but never positive. The contemporary supporters of po and piS, similarly, 
assess nSzz “Solidarność” [“Solidarity” trade Unions] in a positive way, as 
a movement that brought a systemic transformation of the state, and therefore, 
they voted for the candidates from “Solidarity” group in the parliamentary 
elections in 1989.3
These rather clear political declarations found confirmation in views on vet-
ting and decommunisation which, in the light of the opinions of people taking 
part in the survey, are problems that constitute the area of consent rather than 
a sphere of conflict between the proponents of both parties. according to the ma-
jority of the respondents who agreed to comment on the problem, the processes 
should be conducted, because negligence in this sphere has its consequences in 
the contemporary times. other respondents either did not want to present their 
views in this field, or they thought that in poland, there were more important 
problems that should be focused on.
ironically, opinions of the proponents of both parties on popiS coalition 
were characterised by a rather surprising convergence. This political concept that 
was to be realised after the parliamentary election in 2005, and the failure of 
which was received with dissatisfaction by 41 per cent of piS voters and 76 per 
cent of po voters (roguska 2005a), now does not seem to have even a single 
supporter. only one person stated that: “once it was real, but in this case the 
parties would melt to be one. politicians of both of them finally stated that it was 
not beneficial, which was true. i can’t see any possibility to reach an agreement 
with reference to some issues.”
another idea – the formation of the 4th republic of poland – that used to 
be one of the program slogans of the future popiS coalition, clearly separates 
the current supporters of both parties. The respondents’ remarks allow one to 
state that this idea is approached differently in both described environments. in 
the statements of piS proponents, there are clearly more references to the way 
it was approached in the period when the slogan was filled with content, that 
3 as it may be deduced from the analyses, the election, because of its political and opin-
ion-related importance, can be called the founding election. The method of voting in it (for the 
government or the opposition party) is clearly correlated with further political choices made 
by the participants in the successive parliamentary and presidential elections (grabowska 2004: 
164 ff.).
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is, during the period between 2003 and 2005. disclosing of the so-called rywin 
affair could be perceived as the symbolic beginning of the period, whereas its end 
would be the time of the pre-election campaign in 2005. piS as well as po and 
pSl referred to the aforementioned idea differently. The meaning of the slogan 
implying the “formation of the 4th republic of poland” was expressed in a con-
cise, and rather precise way by one of piS voters, who additionally included his 
personal attitude towards the 4th republic of poland in his comment: “honest, 
lawful, and strong state that refers to tradition and breaks with post-communism 
[…] it is certainly clear that this idea is close to me.” it ought to be added that 
such a view is quite typical of piS supporters engaged in the survey, for whom 
the idea is still worth implementing.
po supporters have a completely different attitude to the idea in question. 
in the respondents’ statements there is no reference to the primary meaning of 
the “formation of the 4th republic of poland” slogan. in 2016, it was explicitly 
associated with piS, and the postulate of changing the political system. This may 
explain the fact that po proponents’ reactions to the discussed slogan, without 
any exception, are now critical.
according to expectations, differences in the narratives of po and piS sup-
porters occur in the assessment of round table debates and in the ways political 
events were described between 1989 and 1990. although the opinions about 
round table talks are sometimes nuanced, it is symptomatic that among po 
proponents, positive assessments are predominant, and among piS supporters, 
positive assessments are accompanied by the explicitly critical ones. This regular-
ity reflects the results of a survey conducted on the 25th anniversary of round 
table talks. it shows that positive attitude towards the agreements concluded at 
the round table was presented by 69 per cent of the potential po electorate, and 
37 per cent of the potential piS electorate (pankowski 2014). in the statements 
of po supporters on the subject of political changes and people participating in 
them, the name of tadeusz Mazowiecki, the prime Minister, is often mentioned. 
he is described as a positive character of that period. lech Wałęsa is mentioned 
less frequently, and if any of the po supporters does it, they most often do it in 
a critical way. Some respondents remember their support granted then to Unia 
Wolności [The freedom Union]. While describing the studied period, piS pro-
ponents more often refer to another prime Minister of that time, jan olszewski. 
in majority, they assess his activities in a positive way.
asked about their support for the candidates for the presidential office after 
1990, the respondents whose age allowed for the participation in elections men-
tioned people who, in majority, form two different groups of politicians. in the 
case of po supporters they were: a. Kwaśniewski (or l. Wałęsa), a. olechowski 
(or M. Krzaklewski), d. tusk, and b. Komorowski. on the other hand, piS 
supporters declared their support for l. Wałęsa, M. Krzaklewski, l. Kaczyński, 
j. Kaczyński, and a. duda.
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The scope of integration processes of poland with the European Union was 
an important issue differing the electorates’ opinions, which was most explicitly 
revealed both in the interviews with po and piS supporters, and during the 
discussion of the aforementioned survey by cboS [public opinion research 
centre] (table 3). as it has already been said, the comparison of the results of 
the surveys conducted in 2005 and 2016 allows one to state that piS proponents 
did not change their opinions on the subject of poland in the European Union, 
whereas po supporters, in majority, became the supporters of strengthening the 
integration processes.
This problem found its reflection in the statements of some po support-
ers. While speaking about their anxieties associated with piS taking over power 
in poland, the respondents emphasised international consequences of this fact. 
Their fears concerned the possibility of weakening the relationships of poland 
with the European Union, isolation of poland and less financial resources granted 
to poland from the European Union for the economic development. in these 
statements, integration with the European Union was perceived as a specific 
type of protection against the unfavourable consequences of a change of political 
power in poland. in the interviews conducted with piS supporters, the problem 
of the relationship between poland and the European Union did not occur.
as it has already been mentioned, the questions concerning the reasons why 
the respondents voted for their favourite party were the most important part of 
the interview. The respondents were asked about motivation for their political 
choices, about the parties they cannot imagine voting for, and also about the largest 
differences between the party that enjoyed their support and the party or parties 
they would not vote for. The respondents, po and piS supporters, justified their 
choices, both positive and negative, referring to their own system of values, their 
opinions, and visions of the state they would like or would not like to live in.
differences between the statements of po and piS supporters are clearly 
significant. firstly, which is obvious, they are different in content. The concepts 
concerning polish economy, which, according to po proponents, are much better 
than those of piS, implementation of pro-European policy, and the promoted 
values are the fundamental arguments with which po supporters justify voting 
for their party and aversion towards piS. according to some respondents, the 
same arguments support voting for nowoczesna party. on the other hand, piS 
proponents support their party because, as it was expressed by one of the re-
spondents, it “aims at the formation of a strong independent state on the basis 
of national history and christian values.” The greatest differences between piS 
and the parties that piS proponents could not imagine voting for, are perceived 
by piS supporters in “their rhetoric and approach to history, subjectivity of the 
state, patriotism, heroes, and the ethos.”
Secondly, the motivation of piS proponents is generally more complex than 
the one declared by po supporters. apart from the aforementioned arguments, 
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there are references to piS’s fight with crime, corruption, and the people from 
the previous system who have had significant impact on the current situation 
in the country in many spheres of life.
Thirdly, the ways in which political choices are explained by the proponents 
of both parties also differ from each other with respect to the proportions be-
tween the arguments that advocate the party considered as their own, and critical 
arguments used in descriptions of the disliked party (parties). in the statements 
of piS proponents, motivations that determine giving support to their party are 
predominant over the arguments that result from criticism of the rejected parties 
(po, nowoczesna, and Sld). in the case of po supporters, it is usually the other 
way round. in their statements, opinions which most often answer the question 
why i would not vote for piS are larger in number than the statements answer-
ing the question why i vote for po. This observation is proved by the results 
of the survey by cboS [public opinion research centre] that was conducted 
in spring 2016 (cybulska 2016), so in the same period, in which the analysed 
interviews were held. The studies illustrate that among all the parties whose 
representatives sit in parliament, po is the only party the voters of which, when 
asked about their sympathies or antipathies towards each party, grant higher 
values on the scale of aversion towards piS, than those which describe their 
sympathies towards po. This may mean that in the political self-identification 
of po proponents, the antipathy towards piS performs a more important role 
than the sympathies towards the party perceived as their own. it must be added 
that, in comparison with other parties, po also enjoys the least sympathy in their 
own electorate, and piS enjoys the greatest.
among other issues and problem areas clearly separating the supporters of 
both parties, Smolensk air crash should be firstly mentioned. opinions about 
the causes of the crash, about the actions of the authorities and the commission 
investigating these causes, and finally about the supporters of a narrative that is 
different from their own, as well as about the media promoting this narrative, are 
the crucial elements of the political identity of po and piS proponents. both par-
ties to the dispute concerning the aforementioned issues have their own stories 
about the catastrophe. generally speaking, the participants of one of the parties 
(po) most often claim that the causes of the crash have been fully explained, 
or explained in the majority of areas. in their view, even though poland made 
some mistakes, it “passed the exam.” The same people reject the conspiracy 
theories formulated by the other party to the dispute and blame that party for 
using the catastrophe in a political game. The objection against that accusation 
is, in turn, raised by the representatives of the other party to the dispute (piS), 
while they are accusing the first party of mistakes or intentional negligence in 
conduct, and contempt for the victims, their families and citizens. according 
to this party, various problems associated with the crash have been still waiting 
to be explained. a large emotional load that permeates various areas of the story 
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of the catastrophe may be illustrated by the categories of notions that are used 
by both parties in the description of the supporters of a narrative different from 
their own. The proponents of both parties describe each other similarly while 
talking about the problems of the constitutional tribunal, economy-related af-
fairs, lack of politicians’ responsibility, foreign policy, and the state subjectivity.
Conclusions
in the descriptions of the followers of political parties, in their views and 
opinions, a clear co-occurrence of the elements of sympathy with and trust in 
the supported party, and the aversion towards or even rejection of other parties 
is often emphasised. This phenomenon is most characteristic of the polarised 
party systems. in poland, it is typical of the electorates of all the largest political 
parties (Kowalczuk 2015; cybulska 2016). in their opinions about parties and po-
litical movements, the proponents of po [civic platform], piS [law and justice], 
nowoczesna party, Kukiz’15, pSl [polish people’s party], and Sld [democratic 
left alliance] combine their sympathies with the party they would like to vote 
for, with aversion towards other parties with various intensity and in different 
proportions. however, the described phenomenon takes the most spectacular 
form in the case of po and piS electorates.
The division of voters into po and piS supporters, which has been observed 
for over ten years in poland (although the essence of the political split within 
the population of participants in the elections in the contemporary poland might 
be better described as the division into po and piS opponents) has similarly 
fundamental nature to the political division of polish nation into the propo-
nents of “Solidarity” and post-communist parties in the late 80s and beginning 
of the 90s, that is, in the period of change of the political system (grabowska 
2001). That division, which finds its reflection in voting for Sld [democratic left 
alliance] or for post-solidarity parties, remained vital until the parliamentary 
election conducted in the autumn of 2005. Then, it lost its importance for the 
benefit of the one described in the paper. The subject area of the paper focuses 
on the description of the evolution of sympathies and antipathies between the 
two post-solidarity parties, and also, on the characteristics of similarities and 
differences in the sphere of social composition and selected views of the propo-
nents of both parties, which constitute their political identities.
an interesting completion of the outlined image emerges from the an-
swers to the last several questions of the survey, which concern information 
sources from which the respondents gain knowledge about the current events 
in poland, and people with whom they talk about politics, who comment 
on the events, and who share their opinions with them. in compliance with 
expectations, the respondents’ statements revealed that both groups function, 
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in the majority of cases, in different worlds of media narratives. While ques-
tioned about their favourite sources of information, and also about those they 
do not trust, the respondents, depending on their party sympathies, generally 
indicated two groups of sources. The first group, typical of po supporters, 
includes such sources as tVn, tVn 24, polsat, Gazeta Wyborcza, Newsweek 
Polska, Polityka, wp.pl, onet.pl, and interia.pl. it does not need to be added 
that in this group, there are most often sources that piS proponents indicated 
as those that they try to avoid, or they reach for them less often, because they 
do not respect them. They, in turn, most often use such sources as tVp, tVp 
info, Do Rzeczy, W sieci, wpolityce.pl, niezależna.pl. obviously, in both studied 
environments there are people who reach for both, that is, “civic platform-re-
lated” and “piS-related” media to, as they say, “form their own opinion on the 
particular subject,” and find confirmation of the previously formed opinions, 
which can be observed on the basis of the context of some statements. it is no 
exaggeration to state that the two groups of information sources, while creat-
ing two different narratives about politics and its participants, are significant 
mechanisms supporting certain visions of reality shared by their users and 
balancing their political identities.
The fact that the supporters of both parties generally share their reflections 
about politics with people of the same or similar opinions also has an impact 
on the strengthening of these identities. They often have such an opportunity in 
groups of close family members, but not always, because political divisions into 
“one’s own” and “aliens” also occur within some family circles (they may also 
have intergenerational nature), as well as within groups of friends. po and piS 
supporters also talk to people of different opinions, but the talks usually finish 
when they become too emotional in their nature. in the respondents’ views 
this happens obviously because of their political opponents who react to their 
interlocutors’ arguments too nervously.
The family groups and friends of similar political opinions, in which they 
discuss the current events associated with polish politics, create an effect that is 
close to the one that was called “a filter bubble,” with reference to the activity 
of individuals on the internet (pariser 2011). in the everyday life of individu-
als, the function of an internet browser providing information compliant with 
the earlier choices of other internet users is used by family members, friends 
and acquaintances of the same, po-related or piS-related orientation. They re-
produce opinions that create the only “true” vision of reality in opposition to 
a competitive reality, or realities which, in their view, are untrue. in the light 
of the collected empirical material, the thesis concerning “the filter bubble” is a 
presumption formulated on the basis of statements of some respondents rather 
than an explicit conclusion resulting from the conducted surveys. Therefore, 
this problem ought to be included in further, in-depth research focused on po 
and piS electorate.
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